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Abstract 
By modifying Cournot model, this paper compares the R&D competition in a duopoly industry when two proprietary 
software (PS) producers compete and when a proprietary software producer competes with open source software 
(OSS) producer. This paper assumes proprietary software producer pursues profit maximization and open source 
software is free for users. It is find that: (i) when the learning (maintenance or development) cost of OSS is big (resp. 
small) enough, the R&D effort of PS producer in a industry where PS compete with OSS is higher (resp. lower) than 
when it competes with PS; (ii) when software reservation prices for PS and OSS are same, the R&D effort of PS 
producer when it competes with OSS producer is higher (resp. lower) than competes with PS producer if user’s 
software development skill is low (resp. high) enough; (iii) PS producer is more (resp. less) likely to choose the 
highest (resp. lowest) R&D risk projects when it competes with an OSS producer than competes with a PS producer 
in a software industry. 
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1. Introduction 
Open source software is software whose source code allows software developers to share, identify and 
correct errors, and redistribute, which is usually available at no charge, and which is often developed by 
voluntary efforts (O’Reilly, 1999) [1]. Recent years, open source software has been achieved notable 
success and becomes a powerful rival to proprietary software in many software markets. For instances, 
the open source Linux operating system shares about 30%, where Microsoft’s Windows, a proprietary 
software, holds approximately 50% in server operating system market (Netcraft, 2001) [2]. 
Recently, the academic literature has paid more and more attention to open source problem. Some 
scholars have considered the competition between open source and proprietary software (See [3], [4] and 
[5]). However they haven’t considered how proprietary software firm opens software source code affects 
the R&D competition in software industries. Though two extended Cournot models, this paper 
investigates the impact of open source software to the R&D competition in duopoly software industries.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the basic models are presented and solved. 
In section 3, the optimal R&D efforts and risks are compared. In final part, the paper is concluded. 
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2. The basic models 
In order to investigate how open source software affects the R&D effort and risk of proprietary 
software producer, we present two models in this paper. One model assumes two proprietary software 
producers compete in a software industry. The other one assumes a proprietary software producer faces 
the competition of open source software. Now, two models are given respectively. 
2.1. When PS competes with PS 
This part assumes there are two proprietary software producers, noted by producer 1  and producer 
respectively, in a software industry. According to Cournot model, the inverse demand functions for two 
producers are given by 
2
1 1 1p a q dq= − − ,                                                                                                                           (1)
2 2 2 1p a q dq= − − .                                                                                                                                      (2)
In (1), i  measures the reservation price for proprietary software 1, 2i = ); (0,1)∈ ) denotes the 
degree of substitution between two types of proprietary software  iq  represents the output for proprietary 
software  ( ). 
a
i
i  (  (
;
d
1, 2i =
To improve software reservation price, proprietary software producers perform R&D (research and 
development) innovation. When the R&D effort for producer i  is , it needs to bear investment cost 
equal to 
iλ
( , )i iI μ σ
iλ
, which stands for producer i ’s R&D cost function. This paper assumes proprietary 
software producers are uncertain about the final R&D outcome ( ) when implement innovation 
activities, and  obeys probability distribution 
iλ
~ [ , ]i i iλ μ σ , where [ ,0 )iμ ∈ ∞  and  represent 
the expected value and variance of  respectively (i.e. 
min max[ ,iσ ∈ σ σ ]
iλ ( )λ =i iE μ , i ). For simplicity, this paper 
assumes 
( )iλ =V σ
( , )i iI
2
i i2μ σ = γμ + ησ , where ( )0γ >  denotes the R&D cost parameter and ( )i 0η >  denotes the R&D 
risk cost parameter. After R&D innovation, the reservation price for proprietary software i  ( ) is 
given by i , where  is the reservation price for proprietary software i  before R&D innovation. 
For simplicity, this paper assumes the R&D doesn’t spill over in the industry.  
1, 2i =
0i i
a a= + λ
0i
a
According to (1) and (2), the profit function for producer  is given by i
( ) (
0
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1p q a q dq q 2π = = + λ − − − )γμ + ησ ,                                                                                (3)
( ) (
0
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2p q a q dq q 2π = = + λ − − − )γμ + ησ .                                                                                           (4)
Note that we assume the marginal costs for software equal zero. 
The timing of activities is as follows. In first stage, PS producers choose R&D Risk simultaneously. 
In second stage, they decide R&D effort simultaneously. In third stage, they set quantity simultaneously. 
The model is solved by backwards induction. The optimal quantities are solved firstly 
and then the optimal R&D decisions are considered. 
Stage 3: quantity 
Taking the derivatives of (3) and (4) with respect to  and 2q  respectively, and then setting them 
equal to zero (i.e. 
1q
1 1q 0∂π ∂ =  and 2 2q 0∂π ∂ = ), we obtain the optimal quantities for PS producer  
* [ ( ) ( )] ( )
0 0
2
1 1 1 2 2q 2 a d a 4 d= + λ − + λ − ,                                                                                              (5) 
* [ ( ) ( )] ( )
0 0
2
2 2 2 1 1q 2 a d a 4 d= + λ − + λ − .                                                                                                          (6) 
Because  and  satisfy the second order condition (*1q *2q 2 2i iq 2 0 1, 2i =∂ π ∂ = − < , ), they are the unique 
optimal solution. 
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Substituting (5) and (6) into (3) and (4), we obtain 
[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
0 0
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 12 a d a 4 d 2π = + λ − + λ − − 1γμ + ησ ,                                                                               (7) 
[ ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
0 0
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 1 1 22 a d a 4 d 2π = + λ − + λ − − 2γμ + ησ .                                                                               (8) 
Stage 2: R&D effort 
Now proprietary software producers determine the R&D effort. Since the final R&D outcomes are 
uncertain in this stage, producers choose optimal decisions by maximizing their expected profit functions. 
The expectations for (7) and (8) are 
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1E 4 a 2a 4d a a a a d a 2a 4 d 2π = + 1μ +μ +σ − + μ + μ +μ μ +θ + + μ +μ +σ − − γμ +ησ ,      (9) 
( ) [ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2E 4 a 2a 4d a a a a d a 2a 4 d 2π = + 2μ +μ +σ − + μ + μ +μ μ +θ + + μ +μ +σ − − γμ +ησ ,      (10) 
where  is a constant. cov( )1 2θ = λ λ
Taking the derivatives of (9) and (10) with respect to 1μ  and 2μ  respectively, and then setting them 
equal to zero ( ( )1 1E 0∂ π ∂μ =  and ( )2 2E∂ π ∂ 0μ = ), we obtain the optimal expected R&D efforts 
* [( )( ( ) ) ( )] [( ( ) ) ]
0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 14 2a da 4 d 8 4d 2a da 4 d 8 16dμ = − γ − − − − γ − − − ,                                                    (11) 
* [( )( ( ) ) ( )] [( ( ) ) ]
0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1 24 2a da 4 d 8 4d 2a da 4 d 8 16dμ = − γ − − − − γ − − − .                                                    (12) 
The second order condition requires ( ) ( )2 2 2 2i iE 8 4 d 0∂ π ∂μ = − − < , , that is 1, 2i = ( )2 28 4 dγ > − .γ
Stage 1: R&D Risk 
Taking the derivative of (9) and (10) with respect to  and  respectively, we obtain 1σ 2σ
( ) ( ) ( )2 21 1 2 2E E 4 4 d∂ π ∂σ = ∂ π ∂σ = − −η .  So the optimal R&D risk levels for PS producer are given by 
* * max
min
, (
, (
2 2
1 2 2 2
if 4 4 d
if 4 4 d
⎧σ η < −⎪
σ = σ = ⎨
σ η ≥ −⎪⎩
) ;
) .
2
                                                                                                           (13) 
2.2. When PS competes with OSS 
This part assumes producer 2  opens its software source code and allows software developers to share. 
That is producer 2  produces open source software now. Producer 1  still produces proprietary software. 
The inverse demand functions for proprietary and open source software are respectively given by 
1 1 1p a q dq= − − ,                                                                                             (14)  
2 2 2 1p a q dq c= − − − ,                                                                                                                         (15) 
where , , 0 d  and . In (14) and (15),  and  measure the reservation prices for 
proprietary and open source software respectively; d  denotes the degree of substitution between 
proprietary and open source software;  represents the learning (maintenance or development) cost when 
users use open source software. 
1a 0> 2a 0> 1< < 20 c a< <
c
1a 2a
The R&D innovation of producer  is similar to part 2.1. The R&D innovation of producer  depends 
on its software user number and user’s software development skill. For simplicity, we assume that 
1 2
02 2
a a q= + 2β , where β  ( 0 1< β < ) measures the degree of contribution of each user to the reservation price 
when using open source software (or call it user’s software development skill parameter). 
The timing of activities is as follows. In first stage, producer 1  chooses R&D risk. In second stage, 
producer 1  decides R&D effort. In third stage, two producers set quantity simultaneously. The model is 
also solved by backwards induction. 
Stage 3: quantity 
Since open source software is usually free in reality, this paper assumes 2p 0= . Solving (15), we 
obtain 
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( ) (
02 2 1
q a c dq 1= − − − )β .                                                                                                                         (16) 
Substituting (16) into (14), the price for proprietary software is given by 
[( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( )
0
2
1 1 2 1p 1 a d a c 1 d q 1= −β − − − −β − −β .                                                                               (17) 
According to (14)-(17), the profit functions for proprietary and open source software producer are 
respectively given by 
( ) [( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( ) (
0
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1p q 2 1 a d a c 1 d q q 1 2π = − )
2γμ + ησ = −β − − − −β − −β − γμ + ησ ,                                  (18) 
2 2 2p q 0π = = .                                                                                                                                        (19) 
Note that we assume the marginal costs for proprietary software and open source software equal zero. 
Proprietary software producer decides optimal quantity by maximizing its profit function. Taking the 
derivative of (18) with respect to , and then setting it equal to zero (i.e. 1q 1 1q 0∂π ∂ = ), we obtain the 
optimal quantity for proprietary software producer 
'* [( ) ( )] [ ( )]
0
2
1 1 2q 1 a d a c 2 1 d= −β − − −β − .                                                                                             (20)
This paper assumes the model parameters satisfy the inequality . To make sure  the unique 
optimal solution, it needs to meet the second order condition, which requires 
'*
1q 0>
'*
1q
2 2 0<1 1q∂
0
∂ π . The above 
inequality holds when 21 d−β − > .
Substituting (20) into (18), we obtain  
' [( ) ( )] [ ( )( )] ( )
0
2 2 2
1 1 2 11 a d a c 4 1 1 d 2π = − 1β − − −β −β− − γμ + ησ .                                                                (21)
Stage 2: R&D Effort 
The expectation for (21) is given by 
'( ) [( ) (( ) )) ( )( )( ) ( ) ] [ ( )( )] ( )
0 00 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1E 1 a 2d 1 a c a d a c 4 1 1 d 2π = − 1β + μ + σ − −β − + μ + − −β −β − − γμ + ησ .      (22) 
Taking the derivative of (22) with respect to 1μ , and then setting it equal to zero (i.e. '( )1 1E 0∂ π ∂μ = ), we 
obtain the optimal expected R&D effort for proprietary software 
'* [( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]
00
2
1 1 21 a d a c 2 1 d 1μ = −β − − γ −β − − −β .                                                                                     (23)
The second order condition (i.e. ( )2 21 1E∂ π ∂ 0μ < ) requires ( ) [ ( )21 2 1 dγ > −β −β − ] .
Stage 1: R&D Risk
Taking the derivative of (22) with respect to , we obtain 1σ '( ) [ ( ( ))]21 1E 1 4 1 d 1∂ π ∂σ = − −β −η . As a result, 
we obtain the optimal R&D risk level for proprietary software producer 
'* max
min
, [ ( (
, [ ( (
2
1 2
if 1 4 1 d 1
if 1 4 1 d 1
⎧σ η < − −β⎪
σ = ⎨
σ η ≥ − −β⎪⎩
))] ;
))].
                                                                                              (24)  
3. Comparison 
According to the results in part 2, the optimal R&D effort and risk for two models are compared in 
this part. For comparative analysis, we suppose the software substitution parameters and R&D cost 
functions are consistent in two models.  
Letting [( )( ( ) ) ( )][ ( ) ( )] [ (( ( ) ) )] ( )
00 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2c 4 2a da 4 d 8 4d 2a da 2 1 d 1 d 4 d 8 16d 1 a a= − γ − − − − γ −β− − −β γ − − − − −β +
and comparing (11) and (23), we can prove the following conclusions.  
Proposition 1: (i) when c c> , '* *1 1μ > μ ; (ii) when c c< , '* *1 1μ < μ ; (iii) when c c= , '* *1 1μ = μ .
The above proposition indicates that, when the learning (maintenance or development) cost of OSS is 
big (resp. small) enough, the R&D effort of PS producer when it competes with OSS is higher (resp. 
lower) than competes with PS in a software industry. 
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Letting [( )( ( )( ) ) ] [ (( )( ) )]
0 0 0
2
1 1 11 d a c 2 d 2 d 4 8 da a 2 d 2 d 8β = − − γ − + − − γ γ − + −2
0
 and combining with proposition 
1, we obtain the following results. 
Proposition 2: if , (i) when 
01 2
a a= β < β , '* *1 1μ > μ ; (ii) when β > β , '* *1 1μ < μ ; (iii) when β = β , '* *1 1μ = μ .
The above proposition demonstrates that, in the case of software reservation prices for PS and OSS 
are same, when user’s software development skill is low (resp. high) enough, the R&D effort of PS 
producer when it competes with OSS is higher (resp. lower) than competes with PS in a software industry. 
Comparing (13) and (24), we can prove the following conclusions.  
Proposition 3: for given η , (i) the probability of  is bigger than that of ; (ii) the 
probability of  is smaller than that of .
'*
max1σ = σ
*
max1σ = σ
'*
min1σ = σ
*
min1σ = σ
The above proposition demonstrates that, proprietary software producer is more (resp. less) likely to 
choose the highest (resp. lowest) R&D risk projects when it competes with an OSS producer than 
competes with a PS producer in a software industry. 
4. Conclusion 
To study the impaction of open source software to the R&D motivation of proprietary software 
producer in a duopoly industry, we set up two models. One model assumes two proprietary software 
producers compete and the other one assumes a proprietary software producer competes with an open 
source software producer. In this paper, proprietary software producer pursues profit maximization and 
open source software is free charge. Comparing the optimal solutions of two models, we find that: (i) 
when the learning (maintenance or development) cost for OSS is big (resp. small) enough, the R&D effort 
of PS producer in the industry where PS competes with OSS is higher (resp. lower) than where it 
competes with PS; (ii) in the case of software reservation prices for PS and OSS are same, when user’s 
software development skill is low (resp. high) enough, the R&D effort of PS producer when it competes 
with OSS is higher (resp. lower) than when it competes with PS in the software industry; (iii) the 
proprietary software producer is more (resp. less) likely to choose the highest (resp. lowest) R&D risk 
projects when it competes with an OSS producer than when it competes with a PS producer in the 
software industry. 
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